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LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES IN BANKRUPTCY
PROCEEDINGS
N analysis of the reports of the Attorney General of the

United States with respect to bankruptcy proceedings,
as well as the recent discussions with respect to the enactment of the Chandler Act 1 before the various Judiciary Committees of both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
reveals that there has been a tremendous increase within recent years of the filing of petitions in bankruptcy, not only
by professional men, but also by those not actually engaged
in the conduct of business, such as wage earners, housewives,
and others. In the bankruptcy proceedings of these individuals, as well as those engaged in business, the sole possible
asset, in innumerable instances, has been life insurance policies of the bankrupt. Consequently, considerable litigation
has arisen with respect to the status of the bankrupt's policies
of insurance.
Since 1927 many states, undoubtedly motivated by
the
recent depressions and economic debacles, have enacted statutes for the purpose of exempting policies of insurance so as
to place the same beyond the reach of the creditors of the
insured.
The adoption of Section 55a and its corollary provisions-Sections 55 (b) and (c) of the Insurance Law-by
the State of New York, has been followed by the passage of
similar laws by many other states, including New Jersey,
Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.
Sections 55a, 55b and 55c of the New York Insurance
Law provide as follows:
Section 55a.

Rights of creditors and beneficiaries
under policies of life insurance.

If a policy of insurance, whether heretofore or hereafter issued, is effected by any person on his own life
or on another life, in favor of a person other than
'Enacted June 22, 1938, effective Sept. 22, 1938. The Chandler Act is a
complete revision of the Bankruptcy Act and all amendments thereto since its
adoption in 1898.
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himself, or, except in cases of transfer with intent to
defraud creditors, if a policy of life insurance is assigned or in any way made payable to any such person, the lawful beneficiary or assignee thereof, other
than the insured or the person so effecting such insurance, or his executors or administrators; shall be
entitled to its proceeds and avails against the creditors
and representatives of the insured and of the person
effecting the same, whether or not the right to change
the beneficiary is reserved or permitted, and whether
or not the policy is made payable to the person whose
life is insured if the beneficiary or assignee shall predecease such person; provided, that, subject to the
statute of limitations, the amount of any premiums
for said insurance paid with intent to defraud creditors, with interest thereon, shall enure to their benefit from the proceeds of the policy; but the company
issuing the policy shall be discharged of all liability
thereon by payment of its proceeds in accordance with
its terms, unless before such payment the company
shall have written notice, by or in behalf of a creditor,
of a claim to recover for transfer made or premiums
paid with intent to defraud creditors, with specification of the amount claimed. 2
Section 55b.

Exemption of disability insurance from
execution.

No money or other benefit paid, provided or allowed
or to be paid, provided or allowed by any stock or
mutual life, health or casualty insurance corporation
on account of the disability from injury or sickness
of any insured person shall be liable to execution, attachment, garnishment, or other process, or to be
seized, taken, appropriated or applied by any legal or
equitable process or operation of law, to pay any debt
or liability of such insured person whether such debt
or liability of such insured person was incurred before
or after the commencement of such disability, but this
2

-In effect March 31, 1927.
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section shall not affect the assignability of any such
disability benefit otherwise assignable, nor shall this
section apply to any money income disability benefit
in an action to recover for necessaries contracted for
after the commencement of the disability covered by
the disability clause or contract allowing such money
income benefit.3
Section 55c.

Rights of creditors and beneficiaries
under annuity contracts.

If under an annuity contract, whether heretofore or
hereafter issued, the person who paid the consideration for such contract shall be entitled to any benefits,
rights, privileges, or options, such benefits, rights,
privileges or options shall not be subject to legal process, nor shall such person be compelled to exercise any
such rights, privileges or options, except where such
consideration has been paid with intent to defraud
creditors. But where such person is actually receiving periodic payments under such annuity contract,
such periodic payments shall be subject to garnishee
execution pursuant to the provisions as to such execution contained in the civil practice act, and the surplus of such periodic payments beyond the sum necessary for the education and support of such person,
shall be liable for the claims of his creditors in the
same manner as other such property which cannot be
reached by execution. The creditors of the person who
paid the consideration for any such annuity contract
shall have no right to subject to legal process the benefits, rights, privileges or options accruing thereunder
to any beneficiary or assignee, other than the person
who paid such consideration, nor shall they compel
such beneficiary or assignee to exercise any such rights,
privileges or options, except where such consideration
has been paid or such assignment made with intent to
defraud creditors. The benefits, rights, privileges or
options accruing under such contract to such benefi'In effect May 14, 1934.
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ciary or assignee shall not be transferable, nor subject
to commutation, nor to legal process by the creditors
of such beneficiary or assignee, except in an action to
recover for necessaries, if the parties to such annuity
contract so agree.
An annuity contract within the meaning of this section shall be any obligation to pay certain sums at
stated times during life or lives, or for a specified
term, or terms, issued for a valuable consideration,
regardless of whether or not such sums are payable
to one or more persons, jointly or otherwise, regardless
of whether or not such consideration ispayable in one
amount or in installments, and regardless of whether
or not, in addition to, or in lieu of, such certain sums
payable at stated times, further sums shall be payable
at the end of such life or lives, or term or terms, or
4
any other time or times.
As a result of these statutes, as well as the similar statutes in the other states, numerous questions have arisen as to
the status of the bankrupt's policies of insurance in bankruptcy proceedings.
I.
RIGHTS OF TRuSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY.

The rights of a trustee in bankruptcy in and to the policies of insurance of a bankrupt are fixed and limited by the
provisions of Section 70a, subdivisions 3 and 5, of the Bankruptcy Act, the provisions of which were unaffected by the
Chandler Act.
Section 70a, subdivisions 3, 5, provides as follows:
Section 70a: "The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if any, upon
his or their appointment and qualification, shall
in turn be vested by operation of law with the title of
'In effect April 25, 1935.
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the bankrupt as of the date of the filing of the
petition in bankruptcy or of the original petition proposing an arrangement or plan under this Act, except
insofar as it is to property which is held to be exempt, to all
"(3) Powers which he might have exercised for his
own benefit, but not those which he might have exercised solely for some other person;
"(5) Property, including rights of action, which prior
to the filing of the petition he could by any means
have transferred or which might have been levied upon
and sold under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded, or sequestered: Provided,
That rights of action ex delicto for libel, slander, injuries to the person of the bankrupt or of a relative,
whether or not resulting in death, seduction, and criminal conversation shall not vest in the trustee unless
by the law of the State such rights of action are subject to attachment, execution, garnishment, sequestration, or other judicial process: And provided further,
That when any bankrupt, who is a natural person,
shall have any insurance policy which has a cash surrender value payable to himself, his estate, or personal
representatives, he may, within thirty days after the
cash surrender value has been ascertained and stated
to the trustee by the company issuing the same, pay
or secure to the trustee the sum so ascertained and
stated, and continue to hold, own and carry such policy free from the claims of the creditors participating
in the distribution of his estate under the bankruptcy
proceedings, otherwise the policy shall pass to the
trustee as assets; * * * "
In the absence 6f exemption statutes, the trustee in bankruptcy succeeds to all the rights of the bankrupt-insured in
his policies of insurance, and these rights are the same
whether the policy is payable to the insured, his estate or to
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a third party beneficiary where he reserves the right to change
the beneficiary. 5
In Cohen v. Samuels 5a the trustee sought to obtain the
cash surrender value of the policies of insurance of the bankrupt as of the date of adjudication. The policies were payable to third parties as beneficiaries, reserving to the bankrupt the right to change the beneficiary. Upon the question
as to the right of the trustee to obtain the cash surrender
value of the policies, the court said:
"* * * The policies had a cash surrender value at
the time Samuels was adjudicated a bankrupt which
the companies were willing to pay to him, and in all
of them he had the absolute right to change the beneficiaries.
"The question in the case is the simple one of the
construction of § 70a. By it the trustee of the bankrupt is vested by operation of law with title to all
property of the bankrupt which is not exempt * * *
"* * * The declaration of subdivision 3 is that
'powers which he might have exercised for his own
benefit' 'shall in turn be vested' in the trustee, and
there is vested in him as well all property that the
bankrupt could transfer or which by judicial process
could be subjected to his debts, and especially as to
insurance policies which have a cash surrender value
payable to himself, his estate or personal representative. It.is true the policies in question here are not so
payable, but they can be or could have been so payable
at his own will and by simple declaration. Under such
conditions to hold that there was nothing of property
to vest in a trustee would be to make an insurance
policy a shelter for valuable assets, and, it might be, a
Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917); Cohn v. Malone,

248 U. S.450, 39 Sup. Ct. 141 (1919) ; In re Messinger, 29 Fed. 158 (C. C. A.
2d, 1928) (though the policies were not payable to the bankrupt, the Supreme
Court had. held the cash surrender value of the same was an asset passing to
the trustee, as the bankrupt had the power, by reason of the reservation in the
policies, to make them payable to himself); Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. (2d)
873 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929); It re La Tourette, 23 F. Supp. 631 (E. D. Mo.

1938).
a245 U. S.50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917).
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refuge for fraud. And our conclusions would be the
same if we regarded the proviso alone.
"This court has been careful to define the interest
of bankrupts in the insurance policies they may possess. In Hiscock v. Mertens, 205 U. S. 202, we gave a
bankrupt the benefit of the redemption of a policy
from the claims of creditors, though a cash surrender
value was not provided by it, but was recognized by
the insurance company. In Burlingtzim v. Crouse,
228 U. S. 459, 4'73, we said that it 'was the purpose of
Congress to pass to the trustee that sum which was
available to the bankrupt at the time of bankruptcy
as a cash asset, otherwise to leave to the insured the
benefit of his life insurance.'"
However, in view of the enactment of the exemption
statutes by the various states and the prevailing custom of
making the policies of insurance payable to a named beneficiary, which, in most instances, is either the spouse or the
children of the insured, the foregoing decision has been rendered ineffective. The decision can only be invoked when no
exemption statute exists, or if there is such a statute, when
the policy of insurance is payable to the insured or his estate. In the event the decision is applicable, the trustee in
bankruptcy is vested with title only to the cash surrender
value of the policy of insurance as of the date of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy.
However, irrespective of
whether any exemption statute exists, no rights pass where
the bankrupt does not reserve the right to change the third
'Burlingham v. Crouse, 238 U. S. 459, 33 Sup. Ct. 564 (1913) ; Cohen v.
Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917); Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 256 U. S. 395, 41 Sup. Ct. 503 (1921); It re Gannon, 247 Fed.
932 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917), wherein the court held that industrial insurance, without cash surrender value, did not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, even in the
absence of exemption statutes; In re Samuels, 254 Fed. 775 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918), where it was held that the test of "surrender value" was whether the
policy had a present cash value available to the insured bankrupt in accordance
with the fixed method and by the exercise of his own unassisted will; I re
Greenberg, 271 Fed. 258 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; In re American Range & Foundry Co., 14 F. (2d) 308 (D. C. Minn. 1926) (where the policy was not exempt,
the trustee was entitled to the cash surrender value, even though the premiums
upon the policy had been paid by the wife as beneficiary) ; In re Weisman,
10 F. Supp. 312 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); In re Brecher, 19 F. Supp. 283 (S. D.
N. Y. 1937).
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party beneficiary, since the latter has a vested interest in the
is exempt from the claims of the trustee and
policy which
7
creditors.
The trustee's rights cannot be enlarged by any act or
change of circumstances after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy. If the bankrupt, with policies of insurance payable to himself or his estate, or to a third party beneficiary,
dies after the filing of the petition but before the adjudication of bankruptcy, the trustee is nevertheless only entitled
to the cash surrender value of the policies at the time of the
filing of the petition.8 If at the time of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the policy of insurance had no cash surrender value either because of outstanding loans, extended
insurance or the pledge of the same with some creditor, no
interest in the policy passes to the trustee in bankruptcy,
notwithstanding the bankrupt's subsequent death or the redemption and reinstatement of the policy by the bankrupt.9
The bankrupt, the beneficiary, the assignee or- pledgee of
the policy have the absolute right to preserve the policy by
paying to the trustee the cash surrender value to which the
trustee is entitled, and on such redemption to hold the policy
free of all claims of the trustee in bankruptcy. 10 However,
where a policy is owned or held by a bankrupt as assignee,
it is not exempt, and the policy itself, and not merely its
cash surrender value, passes to the trustee in bankruptcy."
It is important to note that by reason of the express
language of Section 70a, subdivision 5, of the Bankruptcy
"Central National Bank of Washington v. Hume, 128 U. S. 195, 9 Sup.
Ct. 41 (1888) ; In re Samuels, 254 Fed. 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; It re Majors,
241 Fed. 538 (D. C. Ore. 1917); it re Fetterman, 243 Fed. 975 (N. D. Ohio
1917); In rc Weish, Dudley & Bracker, 2 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 258 (S. D. N. Y.
1923).
'Everett v. Judson, 228 U. S. 474, 33 Sup. Ct. 568 (1913) ; Andrews v.
Partridge, 228 U. S. 479, 33 Sup. Ct. 570 (1913) ; Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 256 U. S. 395, 41 Sup. Ct. 503 (1921) ; Ehrhart v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 45 F. (2d) 804 (1929) ; It re McCahan's Estate, 312 Pa. 515,
168 Atl. 685 (1933).
'Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 33 Sup. Ct. 564 (1913); Union
Guardian Trust v. Lohmann, 68 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Hays v.
Harris, 78 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Curtis v. Humphrey, 78 F. (2d)
73 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) ; In re Beachley, 19 F. Supp. 104 (D. C. Md. 1937);
Carr v. Meyers, 211 Pa. 349, 60 Atl. 913 (1905) ; see note 4, supra.
" Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U. S. 459, 63 Sup. Ct. 564 (1913) ; Curtis v.
Humphrey, 78 F. (2d) 73 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935).
'.it re Beachley, 19 F. Supp. 104 (D. C. Md. 1937).
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Act, if creditors do not participate in the distribution of the
assets of the bankrupt estate by not filing or by withdrawing
their claims, they may subject the proceeds of a non-exempt
policy in the hands of the beneficiary to the payment of their
claims. 12
Where the beneficiary of the policy is the bankrupt and
the insured does not have the rgiht to change the beneficiary,
the vested interest of the bankrupt passes to the trustee. This
interest includes not merely its cash surrender value, but
also the right to the proceeds of the policy, as the policy itself passes to the trustee. 13 The same right passes to the
trustee where the policy is on the life of an officer of a bankrupt corporation and the corporation is the beneficiary. Such
4
a policy is not exempt under the state laws.'
Where a policy of insurance is not exempt, the insurance
company cannot refuse to consent to the surrender value
being paid to the trustee in bankruptcy. 5
The bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction over
the trustee's application to determine whether the bankrupt's
policies are exempt and the beneficiary cannot be heard to
object to the summary jurisdiction of the referee to deter6
mine the issues.'
II.
EXEMPTION STATUTES AND RIGHTS OF TRUSTEE THEREUNDER.

The exemption statutes, the rights granted thereunder
to the bankrupt, and the status of his policies of insurance
=Andrews v. John Nix & Co., 246 U. S. 273, 38 Sup. Ct. 249 (1917).
Wolter v. Johnston, 34 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), cert. denied,
280 U. S. 606, 50 Sup. Ct. 152 (1930) ; In re Beachley, 19 F. Supp. 104 (D. C.

Md. 1937).

"'Wolter v. Johnston, 34 F. (2d) 598 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), cert. denied,
280 U. S. 606, 50 Sup. Ct. 152 (1930) ; Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Scales,
62 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 5th, 1937); In re Beachley, 19 F. Supp. 104 (D. C.
Md. 1937). But see Curtis v. Humphrey, 78 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 5th, 1935);
In re American Range & Foundry Co., 14 F. (2d) 308 (D. C. Minn. 1926).
' Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917) ; I, re Samuels,
245 F. Supp. 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); It re Greenberg, 271 Fed. 258 (C. C. A.
2d, 1921); Ip re Messinger, 29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918); In re Reiter,
58 F. (2d) 631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
"6Matter of Brecher, 19 F. Supp. 283 (S. D. N. Y. 1937); Matter of
Goldberg, 19 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 678; Matter of Rosenthal, Ref. Joyce (S. D.
N. Y. June 29th, 1937) No. 66505.
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must be determined by the state laws and the construction
placed thereon by the highest state court, which construction
is binding upon the bankruptcy court.1 7 In Harrison v.
Mifler I the court upon the question of the effect and interpretation of the state statute exempting policies of insurance,
said:
"The matter of exemption is to be determined by the
State laws, and in determining what construction is
to be placed upon a state statute, this Court will be
guided by the construction placed thereon by the Supreme Court of the State."
The bankruptcy courts afford recognition to the state
exemption statutes by reason of the provisions of Section 6
of the Bankruptcy Act, which now provides as follows:
Section 6: "This Act shall not affect the allowance
to bankrupts of the exemptions which are prescribed
by the laws of the United States or by the State laws
in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the
State wherein they have had their domicile for the six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition, or for a longer portion of such six months than
in any other State: Provided, however, That no such
allowance shall be made out of the property which a
bankrupt transferred or concealed and which is recovered or the transfer of which is avoided under this
Act for the benefit of the estate, except that, where the
voided transfer was made by way of security only and
the property recovered is in excess of the amount se"Holden v. Stratton, 198 U. S.202, 25 Sup. Ct. 656 (1904).

The United

States Supreme Court reversed its previous ruling denying the petition for writ
of certiorariand reversed the courts below, in order to follow the decision of
the Court of Appeals of the State of New York upon the status of the tax
claims of the City of New York in bankruptcy proceedings, which decision had
been rendered after the United States Supreme Court had originally denied the
petition of certiorari. New York City v. Goldstein, 299 U. S. 522, 57 Sup. Ct.
321 (1937) ; In re Samuels, 254 Fed. 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1918) ; Sims v. Jamison,
67 F. (2d) 409 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933) ; Harrison v. Miller, 74 F. (2d) 86 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1934); Matter of Marx, 5 F. Supp. 954 (D. C. Ark. 1933).
74 F. (2d) 86, 87 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
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cured thereby, such allowance may be made out of
such excess."
In Matter of Messinger,19 which is probably the leading
case upon the construction and effect of exemption statutes,
and particularly the status of the bankrupt's policies of insurance under Section 55a of the iNew York Insurance Law,
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit laid
down the general rules to be applied. In that case the bankrupt had two policies of insurance payable to his wife as
beneficiary, in which he had reserved the right to change the
beneficiary. The trustee sought to obtain the cash surrender value of the policies as of the time of the filing of the
petition, and the bankrupt claimed the policies were exempt
under Section 55a. In holding the policies were exempt the
court said: 20
"Section 70a of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S.
C. A., § ll0a) determines the disposition of life insurance policies, so far as they may not come within the
exemptions under state laws which are permitted by
section 6, supra. *

* *

"The statute does not exempt the bankrupt if he
exercises his reserved power to change the beneficiary
for his personal advantage, and, indeed, precludes an
exemption in such case by saying that the 'beneficiary
* * other than the insured' shall be entitled to the
proceeds and avails. But it plainly does attempt to
exempt the 'proceeds and avails' so far as beneficiaries, other than the bankrupt, may have an interest
in the policy. It does not protect the insured against
his creditors, and. only" seeks to prevent them from
affecting the rights of the beneficiaries other than himself. While the insured may still change the beneficiary, and appoint to himself under the reserved
power, by reason of the New York Insurance Law, he
cannot be compelled to do this, as he would have been
-29 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 2d, 1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 855, 49 Sup.

Ct. 351 (1929).

" Id. at 159.
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prior to the enactment of Section 55a, because, to do
so would deprive the beneficiaries of their interest.

Thus there is an allowance of an exemption to the
bankrupt to the extent of the right of the trustee to
compel him to exercise the reserved power. While the
benefit inures directly to the beneficiary and not to
the bankrupt, yet it is an exemption of the bankrupt
himself to the extent indicated. * * *
"C** * Section 55a of the State Insurance Law
took effect March 31, 1927, It is unlikely that there
were not creditors existing at that time, seeing that
bankruptcy followed so soon after. To the creditors
whose claims arose prior to the passage of the law, it
would not apply,
"In view of the foregoing considerations, the order
of the District Court is modified, so as to provide that
the trustee in bankruptcy shall be entitled to the cash
surrender value of the policies to the extent of the
proved claims of creditors, if any, which existed on
March 31, 1927, and also so as to provide that, if the

bankrupt shall at any time exercise his power to
change the beneficiary for his personal advantage, the
cash surrender value shall constitute unadministered
assets of the bankrupt estate. As thus modified, the
decree is affirmed."
This case has been followed in all subsequent decisions
of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and
21
by the other Circuit Courts of Appeal and District Courts.
Statutes of the state courts exempting policies of insurance of a bankrupt
have been recognized and allowed in the following decisions: Ala.: Blumberg
& Coxe, 8 F. (2d) 735 (C. C. A. 5th, 1925), holding the policies involved not
exempt as they specifically provided that the proceeds on the bankrupt's death
be first used to pay claims of creditors. Ark.: Harrison v. Miller, 74 F. (2d)
86 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; In re Marx, 5 F. Supp. 954 (E. D. Ark. 1933). Cal.:
It re Fox, 16 F. Supp. 320 (S. D. Cal. 1936). Conn.: In re Reiter, 58 F. (2d)
631 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Fla.: Cooper v. Taylor, 54 F. (2d) 1055 (C. C. A.
5th, 1932), cert. denied, 286 U. S. 554, 52 Sup. Ct. 579 (1932). Iowa: Jens v.
Davis, 280 Fed. 706 (C. C. A. 8th, 1922). Kan.: In re Morse, 206 Fed. 350
(D. C. Kan. 1912). Ky.: In re Renaker, 295 Fed. 858 (E. D. Ky. 1912).
Md.: Hickman v. Hanover, 33 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929). Mass.: In re
Beach, 8 F. Supp. 910 (D. C. Mass. 1934). Mich.: In re Bendall, 28 F. (2d)
999 (E. D. Mich. 1928). Minn.: Ralph v. Cox, 1 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 8th,
1924). Mo.: In re Orear, 189 Fed. 888 (C. C. A. 8th, 1911). N. H.: In re
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As a result, exemption statutes have been construed so as
not to operate retroactively.22
The rights of the insured and beneficiary under a policy
of insurance must be determined as of the date the policy
was issued, 23 and the effective date of the policy is the one
stipulated therein. 24 However, where the policy is antedated, but on issuance it provides that it relates back to the
time of the application and is so dated, that is the effective
25
date of the policy.
Prior to the decision In re Gordob,26 there was considerable doubt as to whether policies of insurance of the bankWhelpley, 169 Fed. 1019 (D. C. N. H. 1909); In re Kibbie, 8 F. Supp. 809
(D. C. N. H. 1934). N. J.: Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d)
74 (C. C. A. 3d, "1930) ; In re Pinals, 38 F. (2d) 117 (D. C. N. J. 1930).
N. Y.: Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied,
293 U. S. 565, 55 Sup. Ct. 75 (1934) ; In re Keil, 88 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 2d,
1937) ; In re Gordon, 90 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937) ; Addiss v. Selig, 264
N. Y. 274, 190 N. E. 490 (1934). Ohia: It re Weick, 2 F. (2d) 647 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1924). Okla.: Brown v. Home Life Ins., 3 F. (2d) 661 (E. D. Okla.
1925). Pa.: In re Lang, 20 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. Pa. 1927); It re Bosak,
12 F. Supp. 278 (D. C. Pa. 1935) ; Joseph v. New York Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa.
460, 162 Atl. 441 (1932). S. D.: In re Carlon, 189 F. 815 (S. D. So. Dak.
1911) ; Magnuson v. Wagner, 1 F. (2d) 99 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924). Tenn.: In re
Stansell, 8 F. (2d) 363 (W. D. Tenn. 1925). Wash.: Holden v. Stratton, 198
U. S. 202, 25 Sup. Ct. 656 (1905). Wis.: In re Churchill, 209 Fed. 766 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1913); Cannon v. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co., 208 Wis. 452,
243 N. W. 320 (1932).
Contra: Cal.: It re A. P. Scheld, 104 F. 870 (C. C. A. 9th, 1900). Ill.:
Ehrhart v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 45 F. (2d) 804 (S. D. Ill. 1929). Md.: In re
Cooper's Estate, 28 F. (2d) 438 (D. C. Md. 1928). But see Hickman v.
Hanover, 33 F. (2d) 873 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929). S. C.: In re Cunningham, 15
F. (2d) 700 (E. D. S. C. 1926). N. C.: Whiting v. Squires, 6 F. (2d) 100
(C. C. A. 4th, 1925).
However, even under Section 55a, policies and the cash surrender value
are not exempt when payable to the insured or his executors, administrators
or assigns. Billings v. Lynch, 161 Misc. 496, 292 N. Y. Supp. 344 (1937);
Oriole Textile Co., Inc. v. Robert Silk & Woolen Co., 147 Misc. 523, 265 N. Y.
Supp. 447 (1932) ; Beigel v. Windschauer, 153 Misc. 389, 274 N. Y. Supp. 850
(1934).
' State exemption statutes have all been held not to affect debts existing
prior to the enactment of the statute. Kest v. Bassin, 78 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A.
2d, 1935); In re Gordon, 90 F. (2d) (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); In re Marx, 5 F.
Supp. 954 (W. D. Ark. 1933) ; In -reBeach, 8 F. Supp. 910 (D. C. Mass.
1934) ; In re Neumaier, 11 F. Supp. 341 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
itnre Weisman, 10 F. Supp. 312 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); Gibbs v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc., 256 N. Y. 208, 176 N. E. 144 (1931).
'New York Life Ins. Co. v. Silverstein, 53 F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 8th,
1931).
' McCampbell v. New York Life Ins. Co., 288 F. 465 (C. C. A. 5th,
1923), cert. denied, 262 U. S. 759, 43 Sup. Ct. 705 (1922); Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Hurni, 263 U. S. 167, 44 Sup. Ct. 90 (1923) ; Sellars v. Continental Life
Ins. Co., 30 F. (2d) 42 (C. C. A. 4th, 1929) ; New York Life v. Tolbert, 55
F. (2d) 10 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932).
90 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
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rupt issued after the enactment of the state exemption statute, were exempt as to creditors whose claims antedated the
enactment of such statute. The Gordon decision resolved
many of these open questions with respect to the status of
policies of insurance and the rights of creditors therein. The
bankrupt had four policies of insurance, of which his wife
was the beneficiary, but in all of which the right to change
the beneficiary had been reserved. Three of the policies were
issued on March 31st, 1927, prior to the enactment of Section 55a of the New York Insurance Law. One of the policies was issued on January 8, 1930. The claims of the creditors of the bankrupt had accrued prior to the enactment of
the statute and the lower court held that by reason thereof
the policies issued prior to its enactment were not exempt,
and that the cash surrender value of said policies passed to
the trustee in bankruptcy as assets of the bankrupt estate.
The lower court held, however, that the policy issued subsequent to Section 55a was exempt. On appeal, the bankrupt
urged that all the policies were exempt, as the claims of
creditors were based upon notes executed after the statute in
payment of obligations that arose prior to its enactment. In
holding all policies not to be exempt, the court said: 27
"There was evidence sufficient to justify the District Court in finding that the note held by the creditor
for $23,847.65 succeeded earlier notes given for indebtedness which accrued prior to the enactment of Section
55a. The fact that these prior notes, except to the extent of $5,150 were marked 'paid' does not require us
to hold that the earlier indebtedness represented by
these notes was extinguished. No agreement to cancel
it was established, nor was such an agreement at all
probable. Indeed we think it was disproved. All the
notes were simply evidence of loans, and the creditor
was, therefore, entitled to take the position that the
claim it relied on existed prior to the enactment of
Section 55a.

* *

*

"A creditor may resort to the cash surrender value of
any life insurance policies of his debtor merely by
'Id.

at 585.
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proving-that he was a creditor before any exemption
statute was enacted. * * *
"But we find no decisions of the Supreme Court or of
the highest courts of the state distinguishing between
policies issued prior to the passage of exemption laws
and those issued after. In Nelson v. McCrary, 60 Ala.
301, such a distinction was repudiated in respect to a
homestead exemption where the land in question was
purchased after the enactment of the statute creating
the exemption. * *
"If the distinction between policies taken before
the enactment of the exemption statute. and after it
were tenable, we should expect that in the former contingency the courts would have allowed trustees in
bankruptcy to reach only the cash surrender value at
the date of the enactment and not the value accrued
to the date of bankruptcy. Yet we believe that the
value at the time of bankruptcy has always been payable in those cases to the trustee.
* * Many a man who becomes insolvent has little
or nothing except the cash surrender value of an insurance policy, often of substantial worth. A distinction between policies issued before and after the passage of an exemption act is not tenable if in either case
there are preexisting creditors. Such a distinction
would be based upon mere speculation and, if indulged
in, to justify an exemption would seem to involve a
result against the general weight of authority. Indeed, it is hard to distinguish between an investment
in life insurance and a deposit in a savings bank." 28
Under the Pennsylvania statutes, when a policy is exempt, a loan made against the cash surrender value by the
bankrupt after the filing of the petition, is exempt and free
' Associated Indemnity Corp. v. Chais, 161 Misc. 763, 293 N. Y. Supp.
280 (1936), holding Section 55b applicable to policies written before as well as
after statute enacted, but not to impair constitutional rights of creditors.
Contra: Cecilian Operating Corp. v. Berkwit, 151 Misc. 814, 272 N. Y. Supp.
291 (1934); In -re Beach, 8 F. Supp. 910 (D. C. Mass. 1934), holding that
policies issued after the enactment of the exemption statute are exempL
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from the claims of the trustee.2 9 The Florida statutes have
been construed in accord with those of Pennsylvania."0
The Pennsylvania and Florida cases are contra- to the
New York decisions, which hold that where the bankrupt
avails himself of the cash surrender value by a loan upon the
policy after the filing of the petition, the cash surrender value
of the policy (as of the date of filing of the petition in bankruptcy) passes to the trustee in bankruptcy. 3 1 The courts of
New York have also held that where the policy was issued
originally payable, to the bankrupt or to his executors, administrators or assigns, it cannot subsequently be converted into
an exempt policy by changing the beneficiary to a third
party.3 2 It is submitted that this rule is too harsh for there
is no logical reason why a policy cannot.be claimed to be
exempt- if the change in beneficiary is made while the
bankrupt-insured has no creditors. 3 3 • This suggestion would
give the protection of the statute to the bankrupt, and would
not be in conflict with the rule pronounced in. In re Gordon
and In re Messinger (that a creditor has a right to resort to
any present and future property of his debtor) , 4 since, if
In re Bosak, 12 F. Supp. 278 (M. D. Pa. 1935).
'It re Vaughn, 2 F. Supp. 385 (S. D. Fla. 1932).
' Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F. (2d) 814 (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; In re Horwitz, 3 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. N. Y. 1933); Butler v. Rand, 11 F. Supp. 343
(E. D. N. Y. 1935) ; Matter of Krauss, 12 Am. B. R. (N., s.) 330.
" it re Feynan, 77 F. (2d) 320 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Kirkpatrick V.
Johnson, 197 Fed. 235 (D. C. Pa. 1912) ; Clowe v. Seavy, 208 N. Y. 496,
102 N. E. 521 (1913); Gould v. Fleitman, 188 App. Div. 759, 176 N. Y. Supp.
631 (1919), aff'd, 230 N. Y. 569, 130 N. E. 897 (1920) ; Stoudt v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 150 Misc. 675, 271 N. Y. Supp. 409 (1933), aff'd, 241 App. Div.
711, 269 N. Y. Supp. 997 (1934) ; Beigel v. Windschauer, 153 Misc. 389, 274
N. Y. Supp. 850 (1934). Contra: Hechtkopf v. Mendolwitz, 156 Misc. 635,
282 N. Y. Supp. 338 (1935).
Cf. In re Phillips, 7 F. Supp. 807 (D. C. Pa. 1934), wherein it was held
that under the Pennsylvania statute, policies of insurance originally payable to
executors, administrators and assigns of the bankrupt, where the bankrupt
changed the beneficiary to a trust company as trustee under a trust agreement
for the benefit of his family, the cash surrender value of such a policy was
exempt from all claims of creditors; Hays v. Harris, 78 F. (2d) 66 (C. C. A.
8th, 1935) (where a policy of insurance was exempt as against the trustee in
bankruptcy of partnership though policy was issued on life of a partner and
partnership was the beneficiary, where the beneficiary was changed to the
partner's wife, long prior to the bankruptcy and while partnership was solvent).
But see Navassa Guano & Co. v. Cockfield, et al., 253 F. 883 (C. C. A. 4th,

1918) (holding that a change in beneficiary in anticipation of approaching death
was in fraud of creditors so that the policy was not exempt).
" Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. 408 (1921) ; W.
B. Worthen & Co. v. Thomas, 292 U. S. 426, 54 Sup. Ct. 816 (1933).
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the change is made while the bankrupt-insured has no creditors, none of their rights can be impaired.
As has heretofore been indicated, policies of insurance
are not exempt with respect to debts existing at the time of
the enactment of the exemption statutes.3 5 Hence, the cash
surrender value of policies of insurance, at the time of the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, passes to the trustee in
bankruptcy where the claims of creditors antedated the enactment of the state exemption law. 31 However, in such instances the cash surrender value passes to the trustee to be
distributed solely to those creditors whose claims arose prior
to the exemption statute, and not to the general body of
3 7
creditors.
If the policies of insurance are surrendered by the bankrupt prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the right
to retain the cash surrender value of the policies will depend
upon the manner of its disposition. "Proceeds and avails"
of a policy has been defined to include its cash surrender
value, and where the same is paid directly to the beneficiary
of the policy, it is exempt and free from the claims of the
trustee and creditors. Where, however, the cash surrender
value is paid to the bankrupt-insured, it is not exempt and
the proceeds pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. If the cash
surrender value is turned over directly to the beneficiary,
either by the insured or the company, it is exempt; if it is
availed of by the bankrupt even for the purpose of buying
property or shares of stock in the name of the beneficiary,
'In construing when the claims of creditors accrued and when they
attained their status as pre-existing obligations, the rule has been laid down
that the claim of a creditor secured by collateral or mortgage prior to March
31, 1927, but based upon an obligation that arose prior thereto, was a preexisting obligation as to which the policy of insurance was not exempt. Kest
v. Bassin, 78 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); It re Jeroloman, 6 F. Supp.
430 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); In re Gordon, 90 F. (2d) 584 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937).
"Kest v. Bassin, 78 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Matter of Gordon,
90 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Matter of Marx, 5 F. Supp. 954 (W. D.
Ark. 1933) ; Matter of Jeroloman, 6 F. Supp. 430 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; Matter
of Beach, 8 F. Supp. 910 (D. C. Mass. 1934) ; Matter of Weisman, 10 F.
Supp. 312 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; Matter of Rechtman, 11 F. Supp. 347 (E. D.
N. Y. 1935). As to Section 55b of the Insurance Law of the State of New
York see Matter of Brecher, 34 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 800, aff'd, 19 F. Supp. 283

(S. D. N. Y. 1937).

*'Matter of Gordon, 90 F. (2d) 583 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); Matter of
Neumaier, 11 F. Supp. 341 (S. D. N. Y. 1935).
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it is not exempt.3 8 Even though the trustee in bankruptcy
has obtained the cash surrender value of the policy from the
company, the beneficiary can collect upon the policy where
it is exempt.3 9
III.
DIsABIUTY INSURANCE.

Disability insurance (ordinarily a supplementary contract to the life insurance policy) and the benefits payable
thereunder, have been held to pass to the trustee in bankruptcy, unless the same are specifically exempted by the law
of the state of the domicile of the bankrupt. This question
was authoritatively settled in Legg v. St. John, 40 where the
United States Supreme Court said:
**

* As

Legg had become totally and permanently

disabled before the adjudication, the company's obligation to make benefit payments monthly thereafter
was property of the bankrupt which passed to the
trustee, unless specially exempted by the law of Tennessee, or by § 70a of the Bankruptcy Act (11 U. S.
0. A. § ll0a). It was not exempted by § 70a, because
the obligation to pay disability benefits is not 'insurance' within the meaning of that section. The term
'insurance' as there used referred only to legal reserve
'As to "proceeds and avails" see: Schwartz v. Holzman, 69 F. (2d) 814
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) ; Butler v. Rand, 11 F. Supp. 343 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
As to right to the cash surrender value see: Union Guardian Trust Co. v.
Lohmann, 68 F. (2d) 311 (C. C. A. 6th, 1933); Harrison v. Miller, 74 F. (2d)
86 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934) ; Kest v. Bassin, 78 F. (2d) 705 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ;
Matter of Lipton, 4 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. N. Y. 1933); Matter of Canariate,
6 F. Supp. 692 (S.D. N. Y. 1933); Matter of Phillips, 7 F. Supp. 807 (D. C.
Pa. 1934) ; Matter of Greenspan, 8 F. Supp. 582 (S. D. N. Y. 1934); In re
McCahan's Estate (Pa. Sup. Ct.) 28 Am. B. R. (x. s.) 749; Wilson v. Mutual
Benefit Life, 182 S. C. 131, 188 S.E. 803 (1936).
" Joseph v. New York Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa. St. 460, 162 Ati. 441 (1932).
But in Frederick v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co., 256 U. S.395, 41 Sup. Ct.
503 (1921), where the insurance company paid proceeds of policy to beneficiary,
without notice of bankruptcy, the trustee could not thereafter recover from the
insurance company the cash surrender value.
'0296 U. S.489, 56 Sup. Ct. 336 (1935).
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life insurance, the kind of insurance to which a case
surrender value was a common incident. * * *
"* * * The obligation of the company to pay disability
benefits in the future is not after-acquired property.
It is property which was acquired by Legg long before
the adjudication, and fully paid for by the premiums
paid before the adjudication. Nor are the benefits
payable after the adjudication in any sense future
earnings. They are not the fruit of anything to be
done by Legg after the adjudication. The right to receive disability benefits in the future does not differ
from any other right acquired before adjudication to
receive money thereafter. It is in essence an annuity
purchased and paid for prior to the adjudication.
Like other property, it passed to the trustee, unless
exempted by the law of the bankrupt's domicile."
In New York the disability benefits payable under a policy of insurance were likewise held not to be exempt under
Section 55a of the Insurance Law. Upon the enactment of
Section 55b the courts construed that section similarly to
Section 55a, holding that the exemption granted thereunder
applied solely to claims of creditors arising after the enactment of the statute41and had no retroactive effect upon the
claims of creditors.
The analysis of the cases indicates that it is only where
the disability arose so that the right to payments under the
disability clause of the contract became effective or invoked
prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, that the disability benefits pass to the trustee in bankruptcy. It would
seem, therefore, and it has been so held, that where the bankrupt was not disabled at the time of the filing of the petition
'Matter of Kern, 8 F. Supp. 246 (S. D. N. Y. 1934) ; Matter of Rechtman, 11 F. Supp. 347 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).
In New York, disability benefits or the assignment of the same are not
exempt as to claims of pre-existing creditors. Likewise, they are not exempt
where the insured is the beneficiary of the policy. Lion Credit Union v.
Gutman, 148 Misc. 620, 267 N. Y. Supp. 67 (1922); Edgar A. Levy Leasing
Co., Inc. v. Wishner, 147 Misc. 828, 265 N. Y. Supp. 184 (1933) ; Herback v.
Herback, 148 Misc. 33, 265 N. Y. Supp. 144 (1933); Horowitz v. Weinberg,
156 Misc. 629, 281 N. Y. Supp. 644 (1934); Ruvinsky v. Schonberg, 248 App.

Div. 602, 287 N. Y. Supp. 637 (2d Dept. 1936).
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in bankruptcy and no claim for disability benefits had been
presented, the independent or separate contract of disability
42
insurance does not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy.
IV.
ANNUITY.INSUnANCB.
Where the state statute specifically exempts annuity contracts of insurance from the claims of creditors, as in ordinary life insurance policies, the annuity contract is exempt
and does not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy even though
the beneficiary's rights might be divested by the bankrupt
by change of beneficiary, by the surrender of the policies or
43
by his survival to the maturity of the policy.
In some jurisdictions annuity-contracts have been held
not to be exempt. 44 The status of this type of 'policy must
be determined 'by the state exemption statute. In Ohio, it
was held that a group 'annuity contract is not life insurance,
and unless specifically exempted by the state statute, the
cash surrender value of such a policy passed to the trustee
in bankruptcy, upon the ground that such a contract was in
effect nothing m6re than an investment and savings plan,
and was not life insurance nor an annuity upon life.4 5 In
Minnesota, where the exemption statute is similar to Section
55a of the New York Insurance Law, it was held that if the
statute exempts in whole or in part the avails of the annuity
policies, the court is required to give the bankrupt the benefit
of the statutory exemption. In .I re Walsk,40 a very wellconsidered opinion, a retirement annuity insurance contract,
in which the primary purpose was to provide annuity for the
bankrupt-insured after attaining a specific age, and which
contained merely incidental provisions for payments to a
named beneficiary under certain circumstances, was held not
'In
re Fishman (D. C. Mass.) Feb., 2, 1938,
' Bowers v. Reinhard, 78 F. (2d) 776 (C. C.

C. C. H. 5025.
A. 3d, 1935).
"In re Baxter (D. C. Ohio) C. C. H. 4687; In re Walsh (D. C. Minn.)
34 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 238.
'See note 43, supra.
"134 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 238.
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exempt as life insurance, and that a mere savings plan annuity contract in which the insurance feature was nothing
more than the return of the cash surrender value, did not
come within the purview of the state exemption statutes with
respect to insurance.
However, under Section 55c of the New York Insurance
Law, an annuity contract, including retirement annuity insurance, is specifically exempted from claims of creditors
and, therefore, would be exempt from the claims of a trustee
in bankruptcy.
V.
ENDOWMIENT INSURANCE.

While it has been held that endowment policies of life
insurance with a third party beneficiary are within the scope
of the state exemption statutes and that the cash surrender
47
value thereof does not pass to the trustee in bankruptcy,
several courts have limited the exemption by holding that in
the event the bankrupt, after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, changes the beneficiary to his personal advantage, or survives to the maturity of the policy, the cash surdate of adjudication,
render value of the policy, as of the
48
passes to the trustee in bankruptcy.
vI.
DIVIDENDS.

Dividends upon a policy of insurance either applied towards the payment of premiums for purchase of paid-up additions, or even left to accumulate at interest, have been held
"hn re Churchill, 209 F. 766 (C. C. A. 7th, 1913) ; In re Weick, 2 F. (2d)
647 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924); Smith v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 43 F. (2d) 74
(C. C. A. 3d, 1930); Turner v. Bovee, 92 F. (2d) 791 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937);
Matter of Walsh, 34 Am. B. R. (N. s.) 238.

'SMatter of Horwitz, 3 F. Supp. 16 (W. D. N. Y. 1933); Moskowitz v.
Davis, 68 F. (2d) 818 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934) ; In re Greenspan, 8 F. Supp. 582

(S. D. N. Y. 1934); Matter of Bray, 8 F. Supp. 761 (D. C. N. H. 1934)
(endowment policy not exempt under the New Hampshire exemption statute).
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to be exempt under the state exemption statutes.4 9 In In re
Kei," ° the bankrupt, under the options expressed in the policy, specifically instructed the company to accumulate the
dividends at interest. After the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, the trustee sought to obtain the accumulated dividends. In holding the accumulated dividends were exempt,
the court said:
"The insured's power to withdraw on the anniversary
date dividends standing to the credit of his policy
when the bankruptcy petition was filed would clearly
pass to his trustee under Section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended (11 U. S. 0. A. § 110). * * *
Therefore the question is whether such dividends are
exempted by section 55a of the New York Insurance
Law. * * * This statute has been construed to exempt
the cash surrender value of policies on the bankrupt's
life payable to his wife, and to prevent his trustee in
bankruptcy from compelling him to exercise the reserved power to change the beneficiary for his own
advantage. * * * If the cash surrender value of a policy is 'proceeds and avails' of the policy, it is difficult
to see why accunulated dividends * * * should be
treated otherwise. * * *, unless decisions of the state

courts compel a different construction we cannot
doubt that section 55a was intended to exempt these
accumulated dividends so long as the bankrupt refuses to withdraw them for his own advantage. Decisions relating to disability payments, which are in
the nature of an annuity payable to the bankrupt, are
entirely beside the mark."
The New York courts are in disagreement upon this
subject.51 The trend of the decisions is to the effect that the
"It re Keil, 88 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 708,
57 Sup. Ct. 911 (1937).
Oid. at 8.
Dividends held to be exempt vnder Section 55a: N. Y. Plumbers Specialty
Co., Inc. v. Stein, 140 Misc. 161, 247 N. Y. Supp. 672 (1931) ; Randick Realty
Corp. v. Moseyeff, 147 Misc. 618, 263 N. Y. Supp. 440 (1933); Robro Realty
Corp. v. Lazarus, 161 Misc. 610, 291 N. Y. Supp. 678 (1936); F. H. Leggett
& Co. v. Frank, 161 Misc. 613, 291 N. Y. Supp. 681 (1936). Contra: Holding
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dividends accumulated at interest upon. policies of insurance
are exempt, and may not be reachedby creditqrs or the trustee in bankruptcy of the bankrupt-insured.52

VII.
PREMIUMS RAID IN FRAUD OF CREDITORS.

Section 55a of the New York Insurance Law, and the
exempjion laws of other states with the exception of New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, specifically provide that policies
of insurance are not exempt as to premiums paid with the
dividends not to be exempt- but passing to creditors: Manufacturers Trust Co.
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc., 244 App. Div. 357, 361, 279' N. Y. Supp.
457, 461 (1st Dept. '1935)-; 242 W. 38th St. Corp. v. Meyerowitz, 162 Misc.
488, 293 N. Y. Supp. 708 (1936), aff'd without opinion, 248 App. Div. 708,
290 N. Y. Supp: 108 (3d Dept. 1936).
In Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Felig, 254 App. Div. 360, 5 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 170 (lst Dept. 1938), the Appellate Division of the First Department reversed the Supreme Court, which had held that accumulated dividends
left on deposit with the company were exempt from -the claims of creditors
under the authority of In re Keil, 88 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). The
policies involved in the case were issued prior to the enactment of Section 55a
and became fully paid up in 1925. After that date and up to the death of the
insured in 1936, the dividends were allowed to accumulate on the policies. The
accumulated dividends were claimed both by the administrator of the estate of
the insured and the committee of the beneficiary,, an incompetent. There were
no provisions in the policies for the payment of the dividend accumulations to
the beneficiary. The policies provided that the accumulated dividends were to
be paid to the insured where no premiums were due. The policies alsq provided
for the payment of .their face amount to the beneficiary. Although it was
contended that dividends were exempt from the claims of creditors, the court
held the statute did not affect 'vested rights nor alter the effect of express
provisions in policies issued prior to its passage. It was further held that
Section 55a did not apply to accumulated dividends upon a policy issued prior
to its enactment under which the dividends were the property of the insured.
The court, in reviewing cases, approved of the holding in Manufacturers Trust
v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, supra, that the accumulated dividends
were the property of the insured, payable to his estate rather than to the
beneficiary upon the death of the insured. Likewise approved was the holding
in 242 W. 38th Streei v. Meyerowitz, supra, that dividends accumulated at
interest uider the option selected by the insured were not exempt from the
claims of creditors, upon the ground that the contract provisions of the policy
prevailed when not in conflict with the statute. The court distinguished New
York Plumbers Specialty Co. v. Stein, supra, in that the policies in that case
provided that the dividends were to be applied towards the purchase of additional insurance if the insured made no other election, and that the additional
insurance or accumulated dividends unpaid at the maturity of the policy were
to be payable to the beneficiary. Under such circumstances the dividends were
exempt and passed to the beneficiary in accordance with the policy requirement
as well as those of the statute.
'See cases cited supra note 51.
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intent to defraud creditors, and that these premiums may be
recovered by the creditors from the proceeds of the policy.
The courts in construing this part of Section 55a, have limited the recovery by creditors and the trustee in bankruptcy
to the extent of the cash surrender value of the policy as is
traceable to the premiums paid in fraud of creditors.53 This
result was reached in Matter of Goodchild,5" where it was
held that the trustee cannot recover the premiums paid in
fraud of creditors out of the proceeds of the policy, but only
so much of the cash surrender value as was created by such
premiums. This rule would appear to be an unwarranted
limitation upon the language of Section 55a, which provides
that the amount of the premiums paid in fraud of creditors
should inure to their benefit out of the proceeds of the policy.
In Matter of Rosenthal,55 it was held that the provisions of
the statute demonstrated that the recovery was measured by
the premium fraudulently paid and not limited to the cash
surrender value created thereby. A similar interpretation
was impliedly stated in In~re Yaeger."'
In construing similar statutes and provisos, the courts
of other states have held that the trustee in bankruptcy can
recover the amount of premiums paid in fraud of creditors
out of the proceeds and avails of the policy, and to the extent
that premiums have been paid in fraud of creditors, the policy is not exempt.5 . This holding appears to be the more
logical and reasonable rule, as the statute itself would indicate that the creditors and the trustees in bankruptcy have
a right to recover out of the cash surrender value or the proceeds of the policy the full amount of the premiums paid in
fraud of creditors.
In the courts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, by reason of the particular wording of their state exemption statLevinson v. Greene, 296 Fed. 598 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) ; I re Hirsch, 4
F. Supp. 708 (S. D. N. Y. 1933) ; It re Yaeger, 21 F. Supp. 324 (W. D. N. Y.
1937) ; Matter of Goodchild, 10 F. Supp. 491 (D. C. N. Y. 1935) ; Matter of
Rosenthal, Ref. Joyce (D. C. N. Y. June 29, 1937) No. 66505.
"

10 F. Supp. 491 (E. D. N. Y. 1935).

Ref. Joyce (D. C. N. Y. June 29, 1937) No. 66505.
121 F. Supp. 324 (W. D. N. Y. 1937) (where the court denied recovery
upon the ground fraud was not established); cf. I re Hirsch, 4 Supp. 708

(S. D. N. Y. 1937).
Levinson v. Greene, 296 Fed. 598 (C. C. A. 9th, 1924) ; Bailey v. Wood,
202 Mass. 562, 89 N. E. 149 (1909).
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utes, a trustee in bankruptcy can not recover from the cash
surrender value the amount of premiums paid in fraud of
creditors. In New Jersey, in Greiman v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 5 8 the court held that the premiums so paid
could be recovered only from the "proceeds" of the policy,
which right did not arise until the death of the assured.
Recognizing that its decision differed from that of In re
Goodchild 51 the court sought to reconcile it by reason of the
difference of language in the exemption statutes of the states.
In Pennsylvania, in Matter of Silansky, 0 it was held
that payments of premiums as well as repayment of policy
loans, even though made with the intent to defraud creditors, were exempt, as the Pennsylvania statute did not restrict the exemption to policies not procured in fraud of
creditors. The court stated that the stipulation would be
otherwise in New York. There, under the decision of In re
Hirseh,61 money repaid on policy loans by a bankrupt while

insolvent with the intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors, might be recovered out of the proceeds and avails of a
policy of insurance which would otherwise be exempt under
the provisions of Section 55a of the New York Insurance
Law. In such case the trustee could recover the fraudulent
payments out of the cash surrender value. 2
The courts have consistently held that the policies of
insurance of a bankrupt should not be made a shelter for
63 Obviously it would
valuable assets and a refuge for fraud.
be unconscionable for the courts to condone and even encourage the bankrupt's fraudulent concealment of assets by
permitting the repayment of policy loans which do not constitute an enforceable obligation against the bankrupt, or
by sanctioning the prepayment of premiums.
The principle announced in New York and in Washington is the more logical and sound rule. The trend of the
decisions is that while the courts will endeavor to afford the
protection granted by the statutes in holding policies exempt,
96 F. (2d) 823 (C. C.
10 F. Supp. (D. C. N.
°21 F. Supp. 41 (D. C.
4 F. Supp. 708 (D. C.
'See note 50, supra.
' Cohen v. Samuels, 245

A. 3d, 1938).
Y. 1935).
Pa. 1937).
N. Y. 1933).
U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36 (1917).
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they will not permit the perpetration of a fraud on creditors
where the insured, while insolvent and with the intent to
hinder, delay and defraud his creditors, repaid policy loans
or prepaid insurance premiums. Such payments should not
and will not be deemed to have been converted into exempt
property, and the recovery of the same will be permitted by
the courts out of the cash surrender value of the policies.
IN GENERAL.

There are various other policies of insurance, which the
courts, by reason of statutory provisions, have always recognized to be exempt as to claims of creditors and the trustee
in bankruptcy.
Thus the proceeds of a policy of group insurance,
whether payable directly to the employee or a beneficiary,
are exempt.8 4
Similarly the benefits and proceeds payable to an employee, officer or agent of any firm or corporation maintaining a retirement or pension fund, whether payable to the
insured or a beneficiary, are exempt from the claims of the
trustee in bankruptcy and the creditors. 5
The proceeds and benefits payable under a policy of
fraternal insurance to the insured or a beneficiary are likewise exempt, 66 as are the proceeds or benefits payable to the
insured or his beneficiary 6 7under a policy of an employee's
mutual benefit association.

The general trend, both legislative and judicial, is to
extend the benefit of exemptions to policies of insurance,
wherever possible. The only limitation imposed is where the
policy is made payable to the insured, his estate or legal representative, in which event the court will be bound by reason of the statutory provisions and judicial interpretation to recognize the rights of creditors and the trustee in
bankruptcy.
MAX SCHWARTZ.
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